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WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW-New Mexico
Clarifies the Meaning of a Special Employer as Distinct
From a Statutory Employer: Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales,
Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc.,
clarified the difference between a special employer and a statutory employer under the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act. 2 The court
held unanimously that .defendant Sagebrush was the special employer of
the plaintiff, a temporary laborer, when he was injured on the job.' The
court found Sagebrush liable for workers' compensation coverage;
there4
fore, Rivera was barred from suing Sagebrush for negligence.
The court applied a three-part test to determine whether an employment
relationship existed between Sagebrush and Rivera and whether Sagebrush
was liable for workers' compensation.5 In doing so, the court drew the
distinction between a special employer and statutory employer, stated the
rules applicable to each employer, and identified situations in which the
different rules apply. 6 This Note will provide an overview of the special
and statutory employer doctrines, examine the treatment of the doctrines
in New Mexico and other jurisdictions, analyze the rationale of the Rivera
court, and discuss the implications of the court's decision on employers
and employees in New Mexico.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jerry Rivera was injured while tagging lumber at a lumberyard owned
by Sagebrush Sales, Inc. 7 Rivera suffered a severe head injury after falling
eight feet from a forklift which was owned by Sagebrush and operated
by a Sagebrush employee. 8 At the time of the accident, Rivera was a
direct employee of Madden Temporary Services, Inc. 9 Rivera's employment with Sagebrush resulted from a contract between Madden and
1. 118 N.M. 676, 884 P.2d 832 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,.118 N.M. 585, 883 P.2d 1282 (1994).
2. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 835. Because the Act does not specifically address special employers,
there was some level of confusion in the New Mexico bar regarding the distinction between special
and statutory employers. Id. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834.
3. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 835.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 678-79, 884 P.2d at 834-35. See infra note 45.
6. Id. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834. The court found it necessary to clarify the difference between
the two type of employers due to the confusion surrounding the topic. Id.
7. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent factual and procedural references refer to Rivera, 118
N.M. at 677, 884 P.2d at 833.
8. Workers' Compensation Accident Report (Jan. 17, 1990) (on file with New Mexico Court
of Appeals).
9. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 677, 884 P.2d at 833.
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Sagebrush, wherein Madden provided temporary labor for Sagebrush on
an as-needed basis.' 0 The language of the contract specifically absolved
Sagebrush from owing any duties toward any worker supplied by Madden
as an employer under the workers' compensation laws.
After receiving benefits from Madden's workers' compensation carrier,
Rivera brought suit against Sagebrush alleging negligence. Sagebrush
moved for summary judgment claiming that Rivera's suit was barred by
the exclusivity provision" of the Workers' Compensation Act because
Sagebrush was Rivera's statutory employer. The district court granted
Sagebrush's motion for summary judgment. Rivera appealed.' 2 The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision and held: 1) Sagebrush was
the special employer of Rivera and was liable for workers' compensation
coverage; 2) Sagebrush did not waive its right to rely on the exclusivity
provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act by contracting with Madden; and 3) the statutory employer provision of the Act was inapplicable
to this case. 3
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Workers' Compensation Law in General
The first workers' compensation act in the United States was passed
in 1908 to cover government employees.' 4 Prior to 1908, an injured
employee had to bring a common law negligence action to recover damages
for a work injury. 5 The theory underlying the passage of workers'

A.

10. Docketing Statement at 3, 7, Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc., 118 N.M. 676, 884 P.2d 832
(Ct. App.) (No. 14724), cert. denied, 118 N.M. 585, 883 P.2d 1282 (1994).
11. The exclusivity provision of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act states,
Any employer who has complied with the provisions of the Workers' Compensation
Act . . . shall not be subject to any other liability whatsoever for the death of or
personal injury to any employee, except as provided in the Workers' Compensation
Act, and all causes of action ... and all statutory and common-law rights and
remedies for and on account of such death of, or personal injury to, any such
employee ... are hereby abolished except as provided in the Workers' Compensation
Act.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-8 (c)(Repl. Pamp. 1991).
12. Prior to oral arguments the court distinguished a statutory employer from a special employer.
Rivera, 118 N.M. at 678,*884 P.2d at 834. New Mexico's statutory employer provision is stated
in § 52-1-22:
As used in the Workmen's Compensation Act . .. where any employer procures
any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor other than an
independent contractor and the work so procured to be done is a part or process
in the trade or business or undertaking of such employer, then such employer shall
be liable to pay all compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act to the
same extent as if the work were done without the intervention of such contractor.
The work so procured to be done shall not be construed to be "casual employment."
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-22 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
13. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 676, 884 P.2d at 832. The case was not remanded to be decided under
the special employer doctrine because the parties agreed that the facts gathered during discovery
were equally relevant to either doctrine. Id. at 681, 884 P.2d at 837.
14. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 573 (5th ed.
1984). By 1921, most states had adopted their own workers' compensation acts. Id.
15. Id. at 572.
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compensation acts was that "human accident losses . . .are to be treated
as a cost of production .... ,,16
Several bargains were struck in enacting the existing workers' compensation laws. Employees were guaranteed compensation for their injuries
arising in the course of employment and employers were granted limited
liability if they complied with the laws.' 7 The workers' compensation laws
created a form of strict liability in that the employer is responsible for
compensating "injuries arising out of his business" without regard to
the negligence of either the employer, worker, or co-worker. I"
1. New Mexico's Workers' Compensation Act
New Mexico passed its first workers' compensation act in 1917.' 9 The
current Act is compulsory, 20 abolishes the common law defenses, 2' and
provides for compensation fixed by statute. 22 Compensation is limited to
injuries arising while in the course of employment. 23 When the employer
complies with the insurance coverage requirements, the employee's remedies are deemed exclusive, and the Act bars an employee from bringing
a common law action against an employer or a fellow employee. 24 However, as a result of the compromise struck between employers and employees, the employee has assurance that he will be compensated. 2 Because
compliance with the Act is compulsory, if an employer fails to comply

16. Id. at 573. The employer is expected to add the cost of insurance coverage to his costs
which will be transferred to the consumer. Id.
17. See Sanchez v. Hill Lines, 123 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D.N.M. 1954) (citing Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932)).
18. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 573.
19. 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 83, §§ 1-24.
20. See Montano v. Williams, 89 N.M. 86, 547 P.2d 569 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 89 N.M. 242, 550
P.2d 264 (1976). The compulsory idea was intended to "equalize the burden over the entire industry."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 573.
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8 (A)-(C). In New Mexico, the employee's negligence is not a valid
defense to a workers' compensation claim unless the employee's conduct was willful. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 52-1-8(C). See also Gough v. Famariss Oil & Ref. Co., 83 N.M. 710, 496 P.2d 1106 (Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 83 N.M. 698, 496 P.2d 1094 (1972) (employee's intentional misconduct which
causes the injury is an employer defense to a claim for workers' compensation benefits).
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-41 to -49 (Repl. Pamp. 1991). The relief available under the Act
is limited both in amount and length of time. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41 (Repl. Pamp.
1991 & Supp. 1995). Employees with total disability incurred after 1987 are entitled to 85% of the
average weekly wage in the state a week. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41(A). If the disability is not
the result of primary or secondary mental impairment, the benefits are available for the remainder
of the employee's life. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-41(A)-(C).
23. See Jelso v. World Balloon Corp., 97 N.M. 164, 171, 637 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct. App. 1981).
The Act sets out three conditions that must be met for an employee to be compensated:
[a] at the time of the accident, the employer has complied with the provisions
thereof regarding insurance; [b] at the time of the accident, the employee is
performing service arising out of and in the course of his employment; and [c] the
injury or death is proximately caused by accident arising out of and in the course
of his employment and is not intentionally self-inflicted.
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-1-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-8.
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, at 574.
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with the Act, the employer exposes itself to common-law liability for an
26
employee's on-the-job accident.
In New Mexico, employers of three or more workers are required to
comply with the Act. 27 Most workers'

workers who neither receive pay
compensation for their services. 28
sation-based criteria for calculating
covered by workers' compensation

compensation statutes exclude

nor expect to receive any kind of
New Mexico requires some compenan award. 29 Hence, volunteers are not
statutes.

2. Applicability to Various Types of Employers
For an employer to seek refuge under the exclusivity provision of the
Act, some form of an employer-employee relationship must exist.3 0 Therefore, employers often seek recognition as either a special or statutory
employer in order to gain immunity from common law negligence suits.
Although few states have actually addressed special employers in their
workers' compensation statutes, 3' courts have applied the statutes to
32
several types of employers including special and statutory employers.
The statutory employer doctrine is the creation of an employment
relationship pursuant to state law.3 3 A statutory employer relationship

typically arises when a general contractor hires another contractor to
complete work that is part of the trade or business of the general
contractor. 34 The statutory employer must retain supervision and control
over the work being done.3 5 The hired subcontractor cannot be an independent contractor. If the requirements of the statute are met, the
general contractor becomes the statutory employer of the subcontractor
and the subcontractor's employees. 36 The statutory employer is shielded
from common law negligence actions for injuries arising in the course
7
of employment.

26. See Montano, 89 N.M. at 88, 547 P.2d at 571.
27. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991). The Act also applies to "all employers
engaged in activities required to be licensed under the provisions of the Construction Industries
Licensing Act." Id. Employers of private domestic servants and ranch and farm laborers are excluded.
Id.
28. IB ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 47.41, at 8-347 (1994).
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-20 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
30. Quintana v. University of California, I11 N.M. 679, 681, 808 P.2d 964, 966 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 111 N.M. 678, 808 P.2d 963 (1991).

31. Elizabeth J. Fullenkamp, Goodman v. Sioux Steel Co.: South Dakota Limits Temporary
Employees' Recovery to Workers' Compensation, 38 S.D. L. REv. 379, 386 n.72 (1993).
32. Statutory employer sections within a workers' compensation act are aimed at stopping evasion
of the act by persons tempted to subdivide their business operations among several subcontractors
in.an attempt to avoid a direct relationship with the workers. IC LARSON, supra note 28, § 49.15,
at 9-29 to -31.
33. In New Mexico the applicable statute is N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-22 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
34. See Quintana, 111 N.M. 679, 681, 808 P.2d 964, 966.
35. The employer does not have a right of control over the manner in which an independent
contractor does the work. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 71, at 509. Subcontractors may or may
not be independent contractors, but the latter are excluded from most statutory employer provisions.
36. Quintana, 111 N.M. at 683, 808 P.2d at 968 (statutory employer relationship established
between the contractor and the general contractor; contractor's employee barred from bringing suit
against general contractor).
37. Id. at 681, 808 P.2d at 966.

Summer 19961

RIVERA V. SAGEBRUSH SALES. INC.

A special employer relationship, on the other hand, arises when an
individual is assigned by a temporary employment agency to work for
another employer.3" When an employer loans or permits his employee to
perform services for another employer, the employee, with respect to
those services, may become the employee of the party to whom his
services are rendered.3 9 The employee has two employers, the general and
special employer, both of whom may be liable for workers' compensation
coverage.40 The special employer becomes liable when "(1) the employee
has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer;
(2) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and
(3) the special employer has the right to control the details of the work." ' 4'
B.

Other Jurisdictions
1. Special Employer Doctrine
Several jurisdictions apply the "Larson" test 42 to determine when a
special employer relationship exists and when a special employer is liable
for workers' compensation coverage. 43 If the Larson factors are satisfied,
the special employer is considered an "employer" and is entitled to
immunity under the applicable workers' compensation act if in compliance
with the act's requirements."
a.

Contract of Hire Necessary Between the Loaned Employee and
the Special Employer
The loaned employee must consent to the employment relationship in
order for a contract of hire to exist between the employee and the special
employer .4 5 As shown in the following cases, courts have found an
employee's consent expressed in a variety of ways.
A New Jersey court found an implied contract of hire to exist when
a temporary employee voluntarily reported to work, complied with the
employer's store policies, and accepted training and guidance from the
borrowing employer."6 The appellate court relied on the Larson test in

38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227 (1958).
39. Id. See also Ghersi v. Salazaar, 883 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Utah 1994) (Stating "A temporary
labor service is a 'general employer'; a temporary employee is a 'loaned employee'; and the business
to which the employee is assigned is a 'special employer."'). Id. A general employer is usually an
employment agency, personnel service or labor broker.
40. Riveia, 118 N.M. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834.
41. LARSON, supra note 28, § 48.00, at 8-434 [hereinafter "the Larson Test"].
42. LARSON, supra note 28.
43. Antheunisse v. Tiffany & Co., 551 A.2d 1006, 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), cert.
denied, 556 A.2d 1206 (N.J. 1989); Santa Cruz Poultry, Inc. v. Superior Court, 239 Cal. Rptr.
578, 580 (1987); Whitehead v. Safway Steel Products, Inc., 497 A.2d 803, 811 (Md. Ct. App. 1985);
Wright v. Habco, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. 1967). But see English v. Lehigh County Authority,
428 A.2d 1343, 1351 (Pa. Super. 1981) (rejecting the Larson test as too broadly asserted).
44. Word v. Motorola, Inc., 662 P.2d 1024, 1027 (Ariz. 1983) (en banc).
45. LARSON, supra, note 28, §§ 48.11-12, at 8-434 to -45. The focus should be on the employee
when determining consent. Id. at 8-440. If the employee did not consent to a contract of hire with
the special employer, the analysis ends. Id.
46. Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008.
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affirming the trial court's
finding that the defendant was a special em47
ployer of the plaintiff.
Maryland courts utilize a five part test to determine whether an employer/employee relationship exists. 4 The five criteria are as follows: 1)
power to select and hire the employee; 2) payment of wages; 3) power
to discharge; 4) power to control the employee's conduct; and 5) whether
the work is part of the regular business of the employer. 49 The two
elements Maryland adds to the Larson test, the payment of wages and
the ability to fire the employee, are often considered by other jurisdictions
when determining the right to exercise control.5 0
Other courts have rejected the Larson test when analyzing the consent
issue. 5 A Pennsylvania court held that the law did not require the existence
of a contract of hire between the special employer and the loaned
employee. 5 2 Rather, the critical factor was whether the employment was
induced by some consideration. 53 Applying the consideration test, the
court found that the plaintiff was working for valuable consideration
54
and hence was an employee of the defendant.
The Pennsylvania court applied the third factor in the Larson test to
determine whether an employee impliedly consented to an employment
relationship.55 The court stated that consent only requires that the employee "consent to submit himself to the control and supervision of the
borrowing employer .... ,,56 Because the temporary employee followed
the instructions of the special employer's employee, the court found he
consented to work for the employer."
An employee's belief as to who is his employer is of little significance
to the courts.5 A plaintiff's characterization of who is his employer is
not controlling because the definition of "employer" is controlled by its
legal meaning in the Act itself and the supporting case law. 59 Maryland
courts have held that the defendant's failure to name the plaintiff as an

47. Id. at 1007, 1009.
48. Whitehead, 497 A.2d at 808.
49. Id. at 808, 809.
50. See Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008; English, 428 A.2d at 1353-54.
51. English, 428 A.2d at 1351.
52. Id. at 1352-53. Plaintiff relied on the Larson test which the court found to be asserted too
broadly. Id. at 1351. Plaintiff argued that an employment contract did not exist between the
defendant and English. The court said the -cases the plaintiff relied upon, when carefully read,
supported the proposition that a contract of hire, express or implied, is not required under the
law. Id. at 1352-1353.
53. Id. at 1353.
54. Id. The defendant was the Lehigh County Authority which hired two temporary workers
from Kelly Labor.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1353-54 (employee clearly consented by showing up to work and following the orders
of the defendant's employee). The court also relied on the fact that the plaintiff knew Kelly Labor
was in the business of supplying workers to employers. Id. at 1354.
57. English, 428 A.2d at 1347.
58. Id. at 1354; Whitehead, 497 A.2d at 812 (stating "the parties' subjective belief as to whether
an employment relationship exists is not dispositive of the legal question of whether one is the
employer of another .... ) (citing Sun Cab v. Powell, 77 A.2d 783, 786 (Md. Ct. App. 1951)).
59. English, 428 A.2d at 1354.
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employee in its answer to interrogatories is not dispositive of the legal
60
question of whether the defendant was an employer of the plaintiff.
The Employee Must Be Engaged in Work That is Essentially That
of the Special Employer
When applying the second part of the Larson test the focus should
be on the relationship between the employee claimant and the special
employer when analyzing the work being done . 6 The following examples
constitute doing the work of the special employer: 1) packing china and
crystal for a retailer of those items; 62 2) sampling sewage at a sewage
metering station; 63 3) loading steel scaffolding for a steel company;6 and65
4) assisting in renovating a building for a real estate holding company.
Each of these activities was found to be the work of the individual
special employers.
b.

The Special Employer Must Have, the Right to Control the Details
of the Work Being Done by the Employee
In analyzing the employer's right to exercise control, the courts look
to whether the employee is subject to the supervision of the employer6
and whether the employer has the ability to discharge the employee.
In New Jersey, a worker's knowledge that she would be terminated if
she did not submit to the defendant's direction constituted control over
the employee. 67 Also, the existence of the right to control an employee
6
creates the employment relationship, not the actual exercise of that control.
A California court applying the Larson test found that the defendant's
control over the plaintiff's job performance implied, as a matter of law,
an employment relationship between the two parties. 69 The plaintiff was
barred from bringing an action against the defendant 70 and was limited
to the remedy provided under workers' compensation.
c.

60. Whitehead, 497 A.2d at 812.
61. Cf. Quintana, Ill N.M. at 681, 808 P.2d at 966 (concluding that in a statutory employer
analysis, the focus is not on the employer and the claimant; rather, it is on the employer and the
contractor).
62. Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008.
63. English, 428 A.2d at 1346.
64. Whitehead, 497 A.2d at 805.
65. Wright, 419 S.W.2d at 35.
66. See Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008 (defendant maintained power to supervise, discharge or
recall the plaintiff during the holiday season); Wright, 419 S.W.2d at 35 (Wright testified that each
day the defendant's employee would instruct him as to his duties for the day). See also Santa Cruz
Poultry, Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (special employer's control over the employee's job performance
implied an employment relationship).
67. Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008.
68. English, 428 A.2d at 1350. The court recognized that the Authority did not exercise significant
control over the sewage sampling but it had the ability to exercise complete control. Id. The court
went on to say that the lack of control exercised by the Authority demonstrated its negligence. Id.
69. Santa Cruz Poultry, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 582. Defendant's employee supervised and coritrolled
the work of the plaintiff. Id. at 579. Plaintiff recovered benefits from its general employer, Manpower
Inc., but sought damages from the defendant. Id.
70. Id. at 583.
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The Larson test does not require an employer to directly control the
payment of wages, taxes, and insurance to the employee in order to
satisfy the right to control test. 7' The payment of money to an employment
agency, in excess of the amount due to a worker, is deemed to be a
satisfactory arrangement if the additional monies are used to provide
insurance coverage for the worker. 72 If an employment agency bills the
special employer for wages plus additional amounts to cover income taxes,
social security payments, unemployment compensation, and workers' compensation, evidence of the billing method is sufficient to show that the
special employer provided for the purchase of workers' compensation
coverage. 73 Hence, the failure of the special employer to directly provide
for workers' compensation coverage does not indicate the lack of an
employment relationship or a lack of control over the employee.
2. A Statutory Employer Is not a Special Employer
In 1983, an Arizona decision enunciated the difference between a
statutory and special employer. 74 The employer asserted a statutory employer defense claiming that it was immune from suit under Arizona's
statutory employer doctrine. 75 The supreme court found that the defendant
did not procure the labor supplier to work as a contractor, which is a
requirement of the statutory employer doctrine. 76 Rather it borrowed the
plaintiff to assist in the task of remodeling the plant which is consistent
77
with the special employer doctrine.
Because the statutory employer defense is an affirmative defense that
must be raised and established by the defendant under the appropriate
legal theory, the case was remanded to decide whether the plaintiff was
an employee under the lent employee doctrine.7 The court also held that
an employee's consent "is not a necessary element for application of the
79
statutory employer doctrine."
C. New Mexico Law
1. Special Employer Doctrine in New Mexico
For the past thirty years, New Mexico courts have applied the Larson
test in deciding whether an employer is liable for workers' compensation. 0
71. Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008; English, 428 A.2d at 1346. See Garcia v. Smith Pipe and
Steel Company, 107 N.M. 808, 765 P.2d 1176 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 673, 763 P.2d

689 (1988).
72. Antheunisse, 551 A.2d at 1008-09.
73. English, 428 A.2d at 1350 (finding the defendant's contribution to the insurance coverage
was shown by the payment of additional monies to the temporary agency). Id. See also Antheunisse,
551 P.2d. at 1009.
74. Word, 662 P.2d 1024. The facts of this case are set out in Word, 662 P.2d 1024, 1025.
75. Id. The defense was based on the ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-902(B) which is similar to
New Mexico's statutory employer statute.
76. Id. (noting that Motorola had not hired a general contractor to do the remodeling). Id.
77. Id. at 1024, 1026.
78. Id. at 1027.
79. Id. at 1026.
80. See generally Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing, Inc., 117 N.M. 697, 875 P.2d 1128 (Ct.
App. 1994); Wuertz v. Howard, 77 N.M. 228, 421 P.2d 441 (1966); and Shipman v. Maaco Corp.,
74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9 (1964).
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In Shipman v. Macco Corp.,81 the court applied the "whose-is-the-work82
being-done" test in deciding whether an employment relationship existed.
The court held that Shipman was the defendant's employee and denied
Shipman the ability to sue the--defendant in tort. 83 The court found that
the employee was engaged in doing the work of the defendant and was
s4
under the "direction and control" of the defendant's employee.

Two years later, in Wuertz v. Howard,8 the court applied the same

test and found the existence of a "special" employer relationship. 86 Wuertz
is different from the other special employer cases because the special
employer relationship developed quickly and without the consent of the
general employer.8 7 In the other cases discussed, a contract usually existed
between the general employer and the special employer, either oral or

written, but the Wuertz court found that a contractual relationship between
the two employers was unnecessary to create a new employment relationship.
In Wuertz, the plaintiff argued on appeal that he was not a special
employee of the defendant because the time he was employed was too

short, the assistance he gave was with the consent of his direct employer,
the accident did not occur on the defendant's premises, and he did not
consent to the new relationship with the defendant. 8 The court found

the following: (1) the term of employment is not part of the test;89 (2)
the direct employer's consent to the "loan" is irrelevant; 9° (3) the location
of the accident was not a pertinent factor in determining the status of

employment; 9' and, (4) although not necessarily required, a consensual
relationship did exist between plaintiff and defendant. 92 The court held
Wuertz to be a special employee of Halliburton, the co-defendant, and
barred him from seeking anything other than workers' compensation

benefits. 93 In the most recent decision, 94 the court of appeals said that
81. 74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9 (1964) (holding that the defendant was not a "special" employer,
but the result was the same).
82. Id. at 177, 392 P.2d at 11 (citing Jones v. George F. Getty Oil Company, 92 F.2d 255
(10th Cir. 1937)). This is otherwise known as the "nature-of-the-work" test.
83. Shipman at 178, 392 P.2d at 12.
84. Id. (finding noteworthy that the defendant had a number of employees on its payroll doing
the exact work of the plaintiff, and the work being done by the temporary employees was ultimately
finished by the defendant's employees). Id. at 178, 392 P.2d at 11-12.
85. 77 N.M. 228, 421 P.2d 441 (1966). Plaintiff was injured when co-defendant's employee
asked for assistance in unclogging a cement hose. The parties stipulated that the co-defendant was
an independent contractor. Id. at 230, 421 P.2d at 442.
86. Id. at 232, 421 P.2d at 443.
87. Id. at 230, 421 P.2d at 442.
88. Id.
89. Id. it 230-31, 421 P.2d at 442.
90. Wuertz v. Howard, 77 N.M. 228, 231, 421 P.2d 441, 443. The plaintiff was relying on a
Wisconsin decision which held "where the employee entered into the service of another at the
command of and pursuant to the direction of his general employer, no new relationship is created."
Id. at 231, 421 P.2d at 442 (citing Rhinelander Paper Co. v. Industrial Commission, 239 N.W.

412 (Wis. 1931)).
91. Wuertz at 231, 421 P.2d at 443.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 232, 421 P.2d at 443.
94. Johnson, 117 N.M. 697, 875 P.2d 1128. The facts of this case are set out in Johnson, 117
N.M. at 699, 875 P.2d at 1130.
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if all three elements of the Larson test were met for both employers,
both would be liable for workers' compensation. 9
2. Independent Contractor Defined in New Mexico
Because the statutory employer doctrine expressly excludes independent
contractors, it is helpful to understand who is an independent contractor
in New Mexico. "The chief consideration which determines one to be
an independent contractor is the fact that the employer has no right of
control as to the mode of doing the work contracted for." ' 96 Thus, an
independent contractor cannot be a statutory employee because the hiring
employer cannot control the details of the independent contractor's daily
work, only the result to be achieved.
3. Statutory Employer Provision in New Mexico
A contract between a general contractor and a subcontractor must
satisfy two express conditions in order for the general contractor to
qualify as a statutory employer under section 52-1-22 of the Workers'
Compensation Act: (1) the general contractor must procure work, wholly
or in part, to be done by a contractor other than an independent
contractor; and (2) the "work ... must be a part or process in the
trade, business, or undertaking of the general contractor." 97 Accordingly,
in New Mexico, the "power-to-control" test 98 and the "relative-natureof-the-work" test 99 are deemed to be consistent with the conditions imposed by section 52-1-22 of the Workers' Compensation Act. 1' °
In Quintana, the defendant met the two statutory employer conditions
as a matter of law. It maintained the right to exercise control over the
day-to-day work done by Pan Am under the contract terms, and it hired
Pan Am to do the work that it would otherwise have to do itself to
keep the lab functioning. Therefore, Pan Am was not an independent
contractor. The defendant fulfilled the prerequisite to immunity under
the exclusivity provision by establishing the existence of a statutory
employer-employee relationship. 10' The court held that the Regents were
entitled to summary judgment pursuant to the exclusivity provision as a
statutory employer.102

95. Id. (reversing the summary judgment granted in favor of the employer but not deciding
whether a special employment relationship existed because the plaintiff had not been allowed to
conduct discovery to adequately determine the relationship between the defendant and the general
employer). Id. at 700, 875 P.2d at 1131.
96. Shipman, 74 N.M. 174, 177, 392 P.2d 9, 11.
97. Quintana, Ill N.M. 679, 681, 808 P.2d 964, 966. New Mexico cases discussed in Quintana
actually referred to a different two-part test which the court found to be consistent with the current
conditions. The previous test utilized by the New Mexico courts combined the "power-to-control"
test and the "relative-nature-of-the-work" test. Id.
98. See Burton v. Crawford & Co., 89 N.M. 436, 553 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1976) (preferring
the relative-nature-of-the-work test as the better method when determining the status of an employee).
99. Id.
100. Quintana, 111 N.M. at 682, 808 P.2d at 967.
101. Id. at 684, 808 P.2d at 969.
102. Id. at 680, 808 P.2d at 965.
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Based on Quintana, the distinction between a special employer and a
statutory employer is that under a statutory employer doctrine, an entire
firm or agency is hired to do the work of the general employer or
contractor.0 3 Conversely, while under a special employer situation, a
general employer lends an individual employee to another general employer
to do the work of the borrowing employer. 04 In a statutory employer
situation, the work procured must remain under the control of the general
contractor, and the relationship analyzed is that between the general
contractor and the hired subcontractor.05 In a special employer case, the
relevant relationship is the one between the lent employee and the borrowing employer.'06
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE RIVERA COURT

After drawing a distinction between a special employer and a statutory
employer, the court concluded that Sagebrush was Rivera's special employer at the time of the accident and was liable for workers' compensation
coverage. 07 The court found that Sagebrush did not waive its right to
rely on the exclusivity provision of the Act and the statutory employer
doctrine was inapplicable. 0 8
In deciding the special employer issue, the court applied the three-part
Larson test and found that Rivera consented to an employment relationship with Sagebrush when he accepted the assignment from Madden.'°9
Under the Larson test, Rivera made an implied contract of hire with
Sagebrush; Rivera tagged lumber, which was essentially the work of
Sagebrush; and Sagebrush had the right to control the details of Rivera's
work at the lumberyard.
The Rivera court applied the Whitehead decision and found that the
lack of an express employment contract between Sagebrush and Rivera
did not create a genuine issue of material fact." 0 The court also relied
on the holding in English to support its conclusion that Sagebrush had
the right to control the details of the work performed by Rivera.",
Sagebrush employees controlled Rivera by instructing him and training
him. Rivera responded to those directions. Rivera tried to show that he
did not require the help or supervision of Sagebrush by arguing that he
''was usually allowed to work alone.'''' 2 The court said the lack of

103. See id., 111 N.M. at 679, 808 P.2d at 964.
104. See Shipman, 74 N.M. 174, 392 P.2d 9.
105. Quintana, 111 N.M. at 681, 808 P.2d at 966.
106. Id. (stating the contrary for a statutory employer analysis).
107. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681, 884 P.2d at 837.
108. Id. at 677, 884 P.2d at 833.
109. Id. at 679, 884 P.2d at 835.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836. As in Rivera, the labor supplier in English did not maintain
significant control over the manner in which English carried out the sewage sampling; it did not
tell English how to conduct the sampling and did not supervise the work being done. English, 428
A.2d at 1350.
112. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 679, 884 P.2d at 835.
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constant supervision did not create a genuine issue of material fact as
to the work being performed, it merely pointed to the degree of control
Sagebrush exercised over Rivera."' 3
Although Sagebrush did not have the ability to fire Rivera from
Madden's employment, Sagebrush maintained the ability to replace Rivera
if his work was unsatisfactory at the lumberyard." '4 The court decided
the ability to replace Rivera constituted a right to control the details of
his work, satisfying element three of the Larson test." 5
Rivera relied on Guerrero" 6 to dispute the existence of a contract with
Sagebrush. 1 7 In Guerrero, the employee spoke Spanish and the special
employer spoke English so the labor broker stopped by the work site
several times during the week to check on the employee and supervise
the work."' A question of fact arose as to who was the employer of
Guerrero since it was unclear which party had the right of control." 9
The Rivera court found Guerrero distinguishable because there were no
questions of material fact in the Rivera case. 20
All three elements of the Larson test being met, the court held as a
matter of law that Sagebrush was a special employer of Rivera and was
liable for workers' compensation.' 2' Because Sagebrush provided for the
payment of worker's compensation through Madden, it was in compliance
from common law suit under
with the Act and was entitled to immunity
122
the exclusivity provision of the Act.
Rivera asserted that Sagebrush waived its right to rely on the exclusivity
provision of the Act because of language contained in the contract between
Sagebrush and Madden. 23 Rivera relied on Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated
Lines, Inc.,1Z4 where the court held that Zero relinquished the right to
invoke the exclusivity provision of the Act because it contracted away
25
the responsibility to pay workers' compensation insurance for the plaintiff.'
113. Id.
114. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836.
115. Id.
116. Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Manufacturing Co., 566 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
117. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 679, 884 P.2d at 835. The Guerrero court held that an "employee
must know or be charged with knowledge of the lending agreement" in order to establish an
employer-employee relationship with a borrowing employer. Guerrero, 566 S.W.2d at 102. On appeal,
the Guerrero court found a lack of consent between the employee and the special employer resulting
in a reversal of the summary judgment granted at trial. Id. at 102.
118. Id. at 102. Labor broker went so far as to instruct the employee on how to do the job,
including pointing out areas of improvement. Id. In addition, the labor broker was present when
the employee was injured. Id.
119. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 679, 884 P.2d at 835.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834. The contract provided that the amount Madden charged
Sagebrush would include the hourly rate charged, payment for payroll taxes, unemployment compensation, and workers' compensation insurance. See supra note 10. The second part of the contract
was a document signed by both parties, wherein Sagebrush stated that it 'will be in no way
responsible' for any injury suffered by a Madden employee on the job at Sagebrush." Id.
124. 93 N.M. 511, 602 P.2d 195 (Ct. App. 1979).
125. Id. at 515, 602 P.2d at 199. The court stated that Zero waived its right to the benefits of
the Workers' Compensation Act and purposefully subjected itself to common-law liability for
negligence when it relieved itself of the obligation to provide workers' compensation insurance. Id.
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The Rivera court found that although the Sagebrush-Madden contract
absolved Sagebrush of any duties under the Act, it concurrently required
Sagebrush to pay Madden for workers' compensation insurance for
Rivera . 26 Since the contract did not absolve Sagebrush of responsibility
for such coverage, but specifically provided for it, Sagebrush was entitled
27
to invoke the exclusivity provision of the Act.
The Rivera court found the statutory employer defense inapplicable
based on the language of the New Mexico statute and the treatment of
the statutory employer doctrine in the courts. 28 Applying the New Mexico
statute, the court said two conditions must be present: "(1) the employer
must procure work to be done by a contractor other than an independent
contractor, and (2) the work must be a part of the trade or business of
the employer.' ' 29 Because the question before the court was whether
Sagebrush was a statutory employer, the court focused on the work
performed by Madden and not Rivera. 30
Following the decision in Quintana, the court concluded that Madden
was an independent contractor because Sagebrush did not have the right
to control how Madden recruited, interviewed or hired its own workers.',
Nor did Sagebrush contract with Madden to run its lumberyard operations. 3 2 Similar to Shipman and Word, Sagebrush used its employees
along with Madden employees to do the same work. 33
' The court concluded
34
that section 52-1-22 was inapplicable.
The attorneys arguing the case originally made a statutory employer
argument but relied on special employer cases.'35 The attorneys took the
position that a special employee was one type of statutory employee
which led the court to explain the difference between the two types of
employers. 3 6 The court accomplished this distinction by highlighting cases
37
where the parties had encountered the same confusion.
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The Rivera decision clarified the distinction between a special and
statutory employer. Temporary workers have a better perception of when
and how they acquire an additional employer and the consequences of
that new relationship. Employers have a clearer understanding of what

126. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 680-81, 884 P.2d at 836-37.
129. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Rivera, 118 N.M. at 681, 884 P.2d at 837. Sagebrush contracted with Madden to obtain
temporary laborers to assist in the work of the lumberyard. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836.
135. Id. at 678, 884 P.2d at 834.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Word, 662 P.2d 1024; English, 428 A.2d 1343.
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they need to do to establish a special employer relationship and the
corresponding benefits.
Employee Prohibitedfrom Bringing Common-law Negligence
Action
Temporary employees now realize how difficult it is to overcome the
exclusivity provision of the Act. Although their common-law remedies
are limited, they have gained assurance that an injury arising at a
temporary job site will be compensated under the Act.
Rivera did not address whether an employee may seek relief from a
special employer when a general employer fails to purchase insurance
coverage with the funds provided. Presumably the employee can proceed
against the general employer in a common law suit for failing to comply
with the Act. 3 ' In this sense, the Act achieves its purpose of protecting
employees from those who wish to evade the system. 3 9

A.

Employment Relationship Treated as a Question of Law in New
Mexico
1. Summary Judgment in Special Employer Cases
One common argument on appeal is whether the court has the ability
to grant summary judgment when determining the existence of an employment relationship.'4 Plaintiffs in New Mexico rarely win this argument
because the courts treat the question of whether an employer-employee
relationship exists as a question of law.14 ' "Where the material facts [in
workmen's compensation proceedings] are undisputed and susceptible of
but one logical inference, it becomes a conclusion of law' 42as to whether
the status of an employer-employee relationship exists.'
While other jurisdictions treat the special employment issue as a question
of fact, 1 43 New Mexico's treats the issue as a question of law. This
benefits employers because the mere act of showing up to work is
construed as impliedly contracting to work for that special employer.
The courts do not seem to consider whether the employee is simply
obeying the general employer.' 44 The courts construe the consent idea
B.

138. See Shores v. Charter Services, Inc., 106 N.M. 569, 571, 746 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1987) (stating
an employee is limited to either filing a workmen's compensation action or filing an action at
common law; "the employee is limited to one remedy"). See also Montano, 89 N.M. 86, 547 P.2d
569.
139. IC LARSON, supra note 28, § 49.15, at 9-29 to -31.
140. Shipman, 74 N.M. 174, 175, 392 P.2d 9, 10 (questioning the court's ability to grant summary
judgment when determining whether an employment relationship existed).
141. Id. at 174, 178, 392 P.2d 9, 12.
142. Jelso, 97 N.M. at 167, 637 P.2d at 849.
143. See John L. Valentino, The Impact of the Temporary Employee on the Employer-Employee
Relationship, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26 (1995). New York treats the special employment issue as a
question of fact. Cf. Fullenkamp, supra note 31, at 400-01 (arguing that the South Dakota court
should have allowed a jury to determine whether the temporary employee had consented to an
employment relationship with the defendant).
144. See 1B LARsoN, supra note 28, § 48.15, at 8-468.
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liberally, favoring the employer seeking immunity under the Act. Thus,
it logically follows that suits will continue to be decided by summary
judgment.
C.

Employer Benefits
Because the special employer doctrine protects general and special
employers from employee negligence actions, employers of temporary
labor145 will seek special employer status. If the three Larson conditions
are met and the special employer provides for the payment of workers'
compensation coverage, she can obtain immunity from common law suit.
Employers would argue that the employees get what they bargained for:
employment with an expeditious remedy if injured on the job. Employees
would argue that employers are getting the benefits of "employer" status
without all of the corresponding burdens.
Employers will seek the special employer label when it benefits them
financially and will seek to avoid it when it exposes them to liability
under various employment laws.'4 Prohibiting an employee from suing
in tort for work-related injuries provides the employer and its insurer a
sense of financial stability. In a special employer relationship, the lending
employer's insurance carrier is usually the company paying the workers'
compensation benefits and medical expenses. The special employer's carrier
remains untouched. Where insurance companies rate employers based on
their safety records, the special employer doctrine protects the special
employer from increased premiums. Utilizing temporary labor or outsourcing certain functions of a business are two ways of avoiding an
employer-employee relationship in an era of expanding employment legislation aimed at protecting employees. Whether the New Mexico courts
will hold special employers to the same employment laws in the future
is unclear.
The statutory employer doctrine benefits companies that find it necessary
or desirable to subcontract out a portion of their operations. Should the
court decide to narrow the type of employers entitled to immunity under
the workers' compensation law, many governmental or quasi-governmental
organizations would be affected in New Mexico. 47 Large employers such
as the national labs often use subcontractors to carry out various functions
such as maintenance, security, and administration. Organizations may
become reluctant to subcontract out portions of their operations, fearing

145.. See Valentino, supra note 143, at 26. "Between 1982 and 1993, temporary and leased
employment grew at the rate of 300% while actual gains in employment increased by only 23%."
Id. (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings (Jan.
1994)).
146. Valentino, supra note 143, at 26. Such employment liability includes discrimination claims,
the Family and Medical Leave Act, wrongful termination claims and the American with Disabilities
Act. Id.
147. The New Mexico Supreme Court is currently evaluating the statutory employer doctrine in
New Mexico through Romero v. Shumate Constructors Inc., 119 N.M. 58, 888 P.2d 940 (Ct. App.
1994), cert. granted, Jan. 9, 1995.
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they would become subject to suit under common law theories of negligence for injuries on the premises.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In Rivera, the New Mexico Court of Appeals clarified the difference
between a special employer and a statutory employer in New Mexico.
The court found the defendant to be the special employer of the temporary
worker because all three elements of the Larson test were satisfied: Rivera
impliedly contracted to work for Sagebrush, Rivera performed work
normally done by Sagebrush employees, and Sagebrush had the right to
control the details of Rivera's work. The worker's common law negligence
suit against the borrowing employer was barred because that employer
indirectly provided for the worker's workers' compensation coverage.
Although the future of the statutory employer doctrine is being challenged
in New Mexico, the special employer doctrine appears well settled.
CHRISTINE M. LANDAVAZO

